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Abstract
Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of participants,
however, can influence the VCG outcome to obtain higher collective profit. To address this
issue, we propose core-selecting mechanisms for their coalition-proofness. We show that core-
selecting mechanisms generalize the economic rationale of the locational marginal pricing (LMP)
mechanism. Namely, these mechanisms are the exact class of mechanisms that ensure the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in linear/nonlinear prices. This implies that the LMP
mechanism is also core-selecting, and hence coalition-proof. In contrast to the LMP mechanism,
core-selecting mechanisms exist for a broad class of electricity markets, such as ones involving
nonconvex costs and nonconvex constraint sets. In addition, they can approximate truthfulness
without the price-taking assumption of the LMP mechanism. Finally, we show that they are
also budget-balanced. Our results are verified with case studies based on optimal power flow
test systems and the Swiss reserve market.
1 Introduction
A rapid transformation has been underway for the last couple of decades to replace tight regulation
of the electricity industry with competitive market structures [1]. This liberalization has been
essential to improve economic efficiency and to attract new investments [2]. Designing electricity
markets, however, is a complex task. One inherent complexity is the need to achieve real-time
balance of supply and demand because of an inability to store electricity efficiently [3]. This task is
made more difficult by both intertemporal and network dependencies, and more recently, by high
penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources [2]. Hence, there has been a surge of interest
in proposing new electricity market designs [4].
This work studies electricity markets in which generators first submit bids representing their
underlying economic costs, and an operator then optimizes all the resources to secure a reliable
operation. The principal element of such markets is the payment made to each generator since the
generators have incentives to strategize around these payments. As such, payment rules need to
be carefully designed to ensure that the generators reveal their true costs which would then yield
a stable grid with maximum efficiency, in other words, maximum social welfare [2].
The locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism is a well-studied payment rule used in many
existing electricity markets [5, 6]. It is based on using the Lagrange multipliers of nodal balance
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equations in optimal power flow (OPF) problems to form linear prices. If generators assume that
the Lagrange multipliers are independent of their bids, then the LMP mechanism is incentive-
compatible, that is, generators are incentivized to submit their true costs. This assumption, also
called price-taking, arises from competitive equilibrium theory; however, it often does not hold
in practice [7]. In particular, empirical evidence has shown that strategic manipulations have
increased the LMP payments substantially in electricity markets [8]. Moreover, LMP payments
are well-defined only under convexity assumptions on the bids and the constraints [9]. Convexity
is a simplifying abstraction of many realistic electricity market models [10, 11]. Without such
restrictions, it is not possible to guarantee the existence of meaningful Lagrange multipliers [12].
In contrast to the LMP mechanism, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures that
truthful bidding is the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium [13–15]. Consequently, several recent
works have proposed the use of this payment rule in a broad class of electricity markets [16–20].
However, the VCG mechanism is often deemed undesirable for practical applications since coalitions
of generators can strategically bid to increase their collective utility. As a result, it is susceptible
to different kinds of manipulations such as collusion and shill bidding [21–23]. In particular, our
recent work has shown that these manipulations are eliminated from the VCG mechanism only
under convex bids and polymatroid-type constraints [19].1 This restricted market problem does
not capture realistic electricity market models. Moreover, since the same participants are involved
in similar market transactions day after day, electricity markets can particularly be exposed to
collusion and shill bidding [25].
These challenges motivate our work on coalition-proof mechanisms that are immune to collu-
sion and shill bidding. These mechanisms are based on the idea of the core in coalitional game
theory [26], and are referred to as core-selecting mechanisms. They were first proposed for auctions
of multiple items in [27], and then applied to auctions of continuous goods (e.g., electrical power)
in [19]. In this paper, we show that core-selecting mechanisms are the exact class of mechanisms
that ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium under linear/nonlinear prices. Our result
implies that the LMP mechanism is core-selecting, and hence coalition-proof. The equivalence of
competitive equilibrium and the core was first shown in [28] for item exchanges under unit demand
and unit supply, for example, house allocation problems. Our work extends this result to auc-
tions involving continuous goods, second stage costs, and general market constraints. In contrast
to the LMP mechanism, we show that core-selecting mechanisms are applicable to a broad class
of electricity markets, such as the ones involving nonconvex costs and/or nonconvex constraint
sets. In addition, core-selecting mechanisms can approximate incentive-compatibility without the
price-taking assumption of the LMP mechanism. We highlight that the benefits of core-selecting
mechanisms are accompanied by nonlinear pricing which might be regarded as a big shift for some
existing markets [4].
Our contributions are as follows. First, we prove that for electricity markets any competitive
equilibrium is efficient. Second, we prove that a mechanism is core-selecting if and only if it ensures
the existence of a competitive equilibrium. This implies that the LMP mechanism is core-selecting.
Third, we derive an upper bound on the profit a bidder can obtain by a unilateral deviation from its
truthful bid, under any core-selecting mechanism. Using this bound, we propose a mechanism that
maximizes incentive-compatibility among all core-selecting mechanisms. Fourth, we show that any
core-selecting mechanism is budget-balanced in exchange markets. Finally, we verify our results
with case studies based on real-world electricity market data.
In Section 2, we introduce a general class of electricity markets and discuss desirable proper-
ties in mechanism design. Using tools from coalitional game theory and competitive equilibrium
1Polymatroid is a polytope associated with a submodular function [24].
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theory, Section 3 proves the equivalence of core and competitive equilibrium. Then, we investigate
incentive-compatibility and budget-balance. Section 4 presents the numerical results. All proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2 Mechanism Framework
We start with a generic one-sided electricity market reverse auction.2 The set of participants
consists of the central operator l = 0 and the bidders L = {1, . . . , |L|}. Let there be t types of
power supplies in the auction. These types can include control reserves, also known as ancillary
services [29], or active and reactive power injections differentiated by their nodes, durations, and
scheduled times. Supplies of the same type from different bidders are fungible to the central
operator. We assume that each bidder l has a private true cost function cl : Xl → R+, Xl ⊆
Rt+. We further assume that 0 ∈ Xl and cl(0) = 0. This assumption holds for many electricity
markets, for instance, control reserve markets and day-ahead markets that include generators’ start-
up costs [18, 29]. Each bidder l then submits a bid function to the central operator, denoted by
bl : Xˆl → R+, where 0 ∈ Xˆl ⊆ Rt+ and bl(0) = 0.3
Given the bid profile B = {bl}l∈L, a mechanism defines an allocation rule x∗l (B) ∈ Xˆl and a
payment rule pl(B) ∈ R for each bidder l. In electricity markets, the allocation rule is determined by
the economic dispatch, that is, minimizing the procurement cost subject to some security constraints
J(B) = min
x∈Xˆ, y
∑
l∈L
bl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. h(x, y) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0.
(1)
where Xˆ =
∏
l∈L Xˆl. In the case of a two-stage electricity market model, y ∈ Rp may correspond
to the second stage variables and the function d : Rt|L| × Rp → R could be the second stage
cost. The function h : Rt|L| × Rp → Rq1 defines the equality constraints and the function g :
Rt|L| × Rp → Rq2 defines the inequality constraints. These constraints may correspond to the
network balance constraints, and voltage and line limits in OPF problems. Alternatively, they may
also correspond to procurement of the required amounts of power supplies, for instance, in the
Swiss control reserve markets accepted reserves must have a deficit probability of less than 0.2%.
Thus, problem (1) defines a general class of electricity market problems, including energy-reserve
co-optimized markets [18], stochastic markets [29,30], and AC-OPF problems [10]. As a remark, if
the problem (1) is infeasible, the objective value is unbounded, J(B) =∞.
Let the optimal solution of (1) be denoted by x∗(B) ∈ Xˆ and y∗(B) ∈ Rp.4 We assume that the
utility of bidder l is linear in the payment received; ul(B) = pl(B)− cl(x∗l (B)). A bidder whose bid
is not accepted, x∗l (B) = 0, is not paid and ul(B) = 0. The utility of the operator u0(B) is defined
by the total payment, namely, u0(B) = −
∑
l∈L pl(B) − d(x∗(B), y∗(B)). This total payment can
be an expected value when the function d is an expected second stage cost. As a remark, if the
problem (1) is infeasible, the utility of the operator is given by u0(B) = −∞.
There are several fundamental properties we desire for the mechanism. A mechanism is in-
dividually-rational (IR) if bidders do not face negative utilities, ul(B) ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L. This
property is also often referred to as voluntary participation or cost recovery. A mechanism is
2Our results can be generalized to exchanges, see Section 3.2.2.
3There are markets that include shut-down costs or minimum output levels [18]. To address these markets, we
draw attention to the properties and the results for which the assumptions, cl(0) = 0 and bl(0) = 0, are pivotal.
4We assume that in case of multiple optima there is a tie-breaking rule.
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efficient if the sum of all the utilities
∑|L|
l=0 ul(B) is maximized. From the definition of the utilities,
we have
∑|L|
l=0 ul(B) = −
∑
l∈L cl(x
∗
l (B)) − d(x∗(B), y∗(B)). Notice that this value is maximized if
we are solving for the optimal allocation of the market in (1) under the condition that the bidders
submitted their true costs {cl}l∈L. As a result, we can attain efficiency by eliminating potential
strategic manipulations.
Connected with the observation above, we say that a mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible (DSIC) if the truthful bid profile C = {cl}l∈L is the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In other words, every bidder finds it more profitable to bid truthfully, regardless of what others
bid. However, unilateral deviations are not the only strategic manipulations we need to consider
in order to ensure that the bidders reveal their true costs.
As the last desirable property, we consider immunity to collusion and shill bidding and this is
the main topic of this paper. Bidders K ⊆ L are colluders if they obtain higher collective utility by
changing their bids from CK = {cl}l∈K to BK = {bl}l∈K . A bidder l is a shill bidder if there exists a
set S and bids BS = {bk}k∈S such that the bidder l finds participating with bids BS more profitable
than participating with a single truthful bid Cl. Finally, by coalition-proof, we mean that a group of
bidders whose bids are not accepted when bidding their true cost cannot profit from collusion, and
no bidder can profit from using shill bids. We remark that it is not possible to achieve immunity
to collusion from all sets of bidders. For instance, no mechanism can eliminate the situation where
all bidders inflate their bid prices simultaneously, see also the examples in [31].
Since the bidders strategize around the payment rule, the design of the payment rule plays a
crucial role in attaining the aforementioned properties. In light of the discussions above, we discuss
two well-studied payment rules that fail to attain some of these properties for the general class of
electricity markets in (1).
2.1 The LMP mechanism
The LMP mechanism is adopted in markets where polytopic DC-OPF constraints and nondecreas-
ing convex bids are considered. For simplicity in notation, assume there is a single bidder at each
node of the network. Under this assumption, each bidder is supplying a one-dimensional power
supply of a unique type. Then, the payment rule is pl(B) = λ∗l (B)x∗l (B), where λ∗l (B) ∈ R is
the Lagrange multiplier of the lth nodal balance equality constraint. See [6] for an exposition
on the calculation of the LMP payments from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of DC-OPF
problems.
Assume each bidder is a price-taker, in other words, considers the Lagrange multiplier of its
node to be independent of its bid. Then, in addition to being IR, the LMP mechanism is DSIC.5
However, this economic rationale of the LMP mechanism involves a strong assumption not found
in practice [8]. Under the LMP mechanism, a bidder can maximize its utility by both inflating its
bids and withholding its maximum supply [32]. On the positive side, in Section 3, we show that
this mechanism is coalition-proof.
Another aspect to consider is that the economic rationale of the Lagrange multipliers follows
from strong duality [10–12].6 For DC-OPF problems, strong duality is implied by the convexity
of the bid profile and the linearity of the constraints [34]. Strong duality, however, may not hold
for the optimization problem (1), and hence the Lagrange multipliers may not be meaningful in
an economic sense. For instance, nonlinear AC-OPF constraints are known to yield a non-zero
5IR requires cl(0) = 0 and bl(0) = 0 for all l ∈ L.
6There are extensions of LMP through uplift payments to address the duality gap specifically arising from the
unit commitment costs [9, 33]. However, the following discussions also apply to those works.
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duality gap for many practical problems [35], and sufficient conditions for zero duality gap are in
general restrictive [36].
2.2 The VCG mechanism
As an alternative, the VCG mechanism is characterized by pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B)) + (h(B−l) − J(B)),
where B−l = {bk}k∈L\l. The function h(B−l) ∈ R must be chosen carefully to ensure IR. A well-
studied choice is the Clarke pivot rule h(B−l) = J(B−l), where J(B−l) is the optimal value of (1)
with xl = 0, removing the bidder l from both the objective and the constraints.
7 This mechanism
is well-defined under the assumption that a feasible solution exists when a bidder is removed. This
is a practical assumption in electricity markets [18].8 The VCG mechanism has been shown to
satisfy IR, efficiency, and DSIC for the market in (1) [19]. This result is a generalization of the
works in [13–15] which do not consider continuous goods, second stage cost and general constraints.
Despite these theoretical properties, the VCG mechanism can suffer from collusion and shill bidding
which can result in a loss of efficiency, see the examples in [19].
In our recent work, we showed that the VCG mechanism can be guaranteed to attain coalition-
proofness only in restricted settings, such as polymatroid-type constraints and convex bids [19,
Theorems 4, 5]. Though the convex bid assumption may be reasonable in certain markets, the
polymatroid requirement is restrictive. In particular, the polytope representing the constraints of
a power system is in general not a polymatroid, and hence, in many electricity markets, the VCG
mechanism suffers from collusion and shill bidding.
Thus, the payment rules discussed above fail to attain some of the desired properties for the
general class of electricity markets in (1). Specifically, the LMP mechanism is not DSIC, and it
may not be applicable to the general setting. On the other hand, the VCG mechanism is DSIC,
but it is vulnerable to coalitional manipulations. In the next section, we focus our attention on
mechanisms that attain the coalition-proofness property.
3 Coalition-Proof Mechanisms
In this section, we study core-selecting mechanisms. These mechanisms are the exact class of
coalition-proof mechanisms [27] in the sense that a group of bidders whose bids are not accepted
when bidding truthfully cannot profit from collusion, and a shill bidder cannot profit more than
its VCG utility under truthful bidding, see [19, Theorem 6]. We start by showing that, in addition
to being coalition-proof, core-selecting mechanisms generalize the economic rationale of the LMP
mechanism. Namely, they are also the exact class of mechanisms that ensure the existence of
a competitive equilibrium. This result implies that the LMP mechanism is core-selecting, and
hence coalition-proof. Since the LMP mechanism may not exist, we then define a class of core-
selecting mechanisms, applicable to any electricity market modeled by (1), that also approximates
DSIC without the price-taking assumption. Finally, we prove the budget-balance of core-selecting
mechanisms.
3.1 Coalition-proofness via competitive equilibrium
To address coalition-proofness, we first define the revealed utilities, that is, the utilities with respect
to the submitted bids. We then bring in the core from coalitional game theory to characterize
7The general form is referred to as the Groves mechanism. The Clarke pivot rule generates the minimum total
payment ensuring the IR property [37]. IR requires cl(0) = 0 and bl(0) = 0 for all l ∈ L.
8For instance, this assumption holds for almost all IEEE test systems [38].
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coalition-proof mechanisms [26].
The revealed utility of bidder l is defined by u¯l(B) = pl(B)− bl(x∗l (B)), and the revealed utility
of the operator is the same as its utility, u¯0(B) = −
∑
l∈L pl(B)−d(x∗(B), y∗(B)). For every S ⊆ L,
let J(BS) be defined by
J(BS) = min
x∈Xˆ, y
∑
l∈S
bl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. h(x, y) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0, x−S = 0,
where the stacked vector x−S ∈ Rt(|L|−|S|)+ is defined by omitting the subvectors from the set S. It
is straightforward to see that this function is nonincreasing, J(BR) ≤ J(BS), for S ⊆ R. Then, the
core is defined by
Core(B) =
{
u¯ ∈ R× R|L|+ | u¯0 +
∑
l∈L
u¯l = −J(B),
u¯0 +
∑
l∈S
u¯l ≥ −J(BS), ∀S ⊂ L
}
.
(2)
A mechanism is said to be core-selecting if its payments ensure that the revealed utilities lie in
the core. Then, the payment rule is given by pl(B) = bl(x∗l (B)) + u¯l(B), where u¯(B) ∈ Core(B).
For instance, the pay-as-bid mechanism is a core-selecting mechanism where u¯l(B) = 0 for all
l ∈ L, and u¯0(B) = −J(B) [39]. This implies that the core is nonempty and these mechanisms
exist. Furthermore, core-selecting mechanisms are IR since the revealed utilities are restricted to
the nonnegative orthant for the bidders in (2).9
Core-selecting mechanisms are coalition-proof for the market in (1) [19]. The core ensures this
property since the inequality constraints in (2) restrict the revealed utilities such that they cannot
be improved upon by forming coalitions. In fact, the VCG mechanism fails to attain coalition-
proofness since it is in general not a core-selecting mechanism. Our main result of this section
shows that the core-selecting mechanisms offer an economic rationale similar to that of the LMP
mechanism. To state this result, we bring in tools from competitive equilibrium theory [7].
Definition 1 An allocation x∗ ∈ Rt|L|+ and a set of price functions {ψl}l∈L, where ψl : Rt+ → R
and ψl(0) = 0, constitute a competitive equilibrium if and only if the following two conditions hold
(i) x∗l ∈ arg max
xl∈Xl
ψl(xl)− cl(xl),∀l ∈ L, (3)
(ii) x∗ ∈ arg min
x∈Rt|L|+
 miny:h(x,y)=0
g(x,y)≤0
∑
l∈L
ψl(xl) + d(x, y)
 . (4)
As a remark, price functions {ψl}l∈L map from power supplies to prices, whereas the pay-
ments {pl}l∈L map from the bid profile to the payment received by each bidder. Notice that the
functions {ψl}l∈L can be nonlinear and bidder-dependent. As a result, this definition extends be-
yond the traditional Walrasian competitive equilibrium which requires a linear price for each type
of supply [7, 40–42].
9If bl(0) 6= 0, J may not be nonincreasing, pay-as-bid utilities may not lie in the core, and the core may not be
nonempty. In this case, to guarantee that the core exists, individual-rationality constraints u¯−0 = (u¯1, . . . , u¯|L|)
> ∈
R|L|+ can be removed. This new core is nonempty since it is downward open for u¯−0.
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The central assumption of a competitive equilibrium is that participants do not anticipate
their effects on the price functions. Consequently, bidders are willing to supply their allocations
since by (3) these allocations maximize their utilities. Furthermore, these allocations are also
optimal for the central operator by (4). We highlight that a competitive equilibrium is not a game-
theoretic solution, under either the cooperative or noncooperative approaches. Instead, it is a set
of consistency conditions that models how payments would be formed from economic interactions.
These conditions are considered to be a powerful benchmark in the economic analysis [7].
Next, we show that for competitive equilibrium analysis we can restrict our attention to the
optimal allocation of (1) under the truthful bid profile. To this end, the following lemma proves
that a competitive equilibrium is efficient.
Lemma 1 If an allocation x∗ and price functions {ψl}l∈L constitute a competitive equilibrium,
then x∗ = x∗(C).
The proof is relegated to Appendix A. We say that a mechanism ensures the existence of a
competitive equilibrium if there exists a set of price functions {ψl}l∈L such that these price functions
constitute a competitive equilibrium with x∗(C), and ψl(x∗l (C)) = pl(C) for all l ∈ L. Under such
mechanisms, we highlight that the condition in (3) implies that if bidders treat their price functions
to be independent of their bids, then they would bid truthfully since x∗l (C) maximizes their utility.
As an example, we revisit the DC-OPF problem with a single bidder at each node. Recall that
λ∗l (C) ∈ R is the Lagrange multiplier of the lth nodal balance equality constraint. If strong duality
holds, then the LMP mechanism results in a competitive equilibrium with the allocation x∗(C),
and the set of price functions ψLMPl (x) = λ
∗
l (C)x for all l ∈ L [5,6]. As a remark, in case there are
several bidders on a node in a DC-OPF problem, these bidders would be supplying the same type
of power supply to the grid. Notice that these bidders would also face the same LMP price function
since these functions are formed by the Lagrange multipliers of the nodes. Hence, the LMP price
functions are considered to be bidder-independent.
We are now ready to prove that core-selecting mechanisms coincide with mechanisms that ensure
the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 1 A mechanism is core-selecting if and only if it ensures the existence of a competitive
equilibrium.
The proof is relegated to Appendix B. As a corollary, the LMP mechanism is core-selecting,
and hence it is also coalition-proof. Coalition-proofness can be another motivation for using LMP
in DC-OPF problems.10
Theorem 1 shows that core-selecting mechanisms generalize the economic rationale of the LMP
prices to core prices. The latter price can be nonlinear and bidder-dependent. As mentioned
earlier, Lagrange multipliers may not constitute a competitive equilibrium since strong duality
may not hold for the general class of electricity markets in (1). For instance, deriving a meaningful
payment mechanism to accompany nonconvex AC-OPF dispatch is an open problem [4]. As core-
selecting mechanisms exist even under nonconvex bids and nonconvex constraint sets, they are
viable payment mechanisms for any market modeled by (1).
Nevertheless, the VCG mechanism is the unique DSIC mechanism calculating the optimal al-
location rule [37, 43]. Since the VCG mechanism may not be core-selecting, the DSIC property is
in general violated under core-selecting mechanisms, and unilateral deviations can be profitable.
10As a side note, using Theorem 1, we can prove that the LMP payments are upper bounded by the VCG payments,
see Appendix C
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Furthermore, competitive equilibrium theory relies on bidders treating their price functions as in-
dependent from their bids. This assumption does not take into account the full set of strategic
behaviors. In the next section, we address the design of coalition-proof mechanisms to approximate
DSIC without the price-taking assumption. We then address the case where the demand-side also
submits bids.
3.2 Designing coalition-proof mechanisms
3.2.1 Approximating DSIC
In this section, we characterize the class of core-selecting mechanisms that approximates DSIC
by minimizing the sum of potential profits of each bidder from a unilateral deviation. Invoking
the claim in [44], approximating DSIC provides us also with a meaningful method to achieve an
approximate efficiency property.
First, we quantify the violation of the DSIC property under any core-selecting mechanism.
Lemma 2 Under any core-selecting mechanism, the maximum profit of bidder l by a unilateral de-
viation from its truthful bid is u¯VCGl (Cl,B−l)−u¯l(Cl,B−l), where u¯VCGl (Cl,B−l) = J(B−l)−J(Cl,B−l).
The proof is relegated to Appendix D. This lemma provides us with a measure for the loss
of incentive-compatibility under any core-selecting mechanism. Note that calculating the optimal
deviation given in the proof of Lemma 2 requires full information of the bid profile. Moreover,
attempting this optimal deviation involves a risk since bidding any amount higher would result in
zero allocation and zero utility.
Next, we design an approximately DSIC core-selecting mechanism. A mechanism is said to be
maximum payment core-selecting (MPCS) if its revealed utilities are given by,
u¯MPCS(B) = arg max
u∈Core(B)
∑
l∈L
ul − 
∥∥ul − u¯VCGl (B)∥∥22 , (5)
where  is a small positive number. The second term in the objective of the problem (5) is used
as a tie-breaker. This term ensures that the optimizer is unique by picking the utilities that are
nearest to the VCG utilities. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the revealed utilities for two bidders
under different mechanisms.11 We highlight that problem (5) is a convex quadratic program since
the core is given by a set of linear equality and inequality constraints in (2). In the numerics, we
discuss its computational aspects.
The following theorem shows that the MPCS mechanism approximates the DSIC property.
Theorem 2 The MPCS mechanism in (5) minimizes the sum of maximum profits of each bidder
by a unilateral deviation from their truthful bids among all other core-selecting mechanisms.
The proof is relegated to Appendix E. Under the MPCS mechanism, the total incentives to
deviate from truthful bidding are minimal, and hence it is approximately DSIC. As a remark, when
the VCG utilities lie in the core, they constitute the optimizer to the problem (5). This follows
since u¯VCGl (B) = max{u¯l | u¯ ∈ Core(B)} [39]. Hence, for such instances, the MPCS mechanism is
equivalent to the VCG mechanism. The LMP mechanism, however, does not have this property.
11By definition, under the MPCS mechanism sum of the utilities of the bidders are higher than the one under the
LMP mechanism. However, we underline that every bidder may not receive an MPCS utility higher than its LMP
utility. In the numerics, we provide one such instance.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the revealed utilities under different mechanisms
The MPCS mechanism does not rely on the price-taking assumption to approximate DSIC.
In return, it generally yields nonlinear and bidder-dependent payments. Nonlinearity might be
regarded as a big shift for some existing markets [4]. Moreover, the bidders could find it hard to
accept bidder-dependency, or this property might even be precluded by law [3]. Nevertheless, the
MPCS mechanism can still provide an elegant economic rationale when meaningful linear prices
do not exist. The coalition-proofness property of the MPCS mechanism discourages bidders from
entering the market with multiple identities to try and exploit the bidder-dependency.
3.2.2 Market design considerations in exchanges
In this section, we extend our model to exchange markets. We assume that each bidder l has a
private true cost function cl : Xl → R, where 0 ∈ Xl ⊆ Rt and cl(0) = 0. Furthermore, the bid
function is denoted by bl : Xˆl → R, where 0 ∈ Xˆl ⊆ Rt and bl(0) = 0. Note that the domains
of these functions are now relaxed to Rt. As a remark, an exchange market is more general
than a two-sided market since these bid functions can also represent a bidder interested in buying
and selling different types of supplies simultaneously. The remaining definitions for the one-sided
auctions naturally extend to exchanges. Moreover, results on IR, DSIC, coalition-proofness, and
competitive equilibrium further hold in exchanges when we relax the power supply domains from
Rt+ to Rt. For instance, the core is again defined by (2).12 Then, the proof of [19, Theorem 6]
applies to exchanges, proving the connection between coalition-proofness and core-selecting.
In addition to the properties we studied so far, an exchange requires that the operator obtains a
revenue, adequate to cover its total payment to balance its budget. In one-sided markets, this might
be less of an issue since the demand-side is assumed to be inelastic to the price changes. We say that
a mechanism is budget-balanced if the operator has a nonnegative utility under any bid profile B,
u0(B) ≥ 0. We say that it is strongly budget-balanced if this utility is exactly zero, u0(B) = 0.
Under DC-OPF exchange problems, the LMP mechanism is budget-balanced [6, Fact 4]. On the
other hand, the VCG mechanism is not always budget-balanced.13 This follows from the Myerson-
Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, which shows that no exchange can always be efficient, DSIC,
12In the combinatorial exchange literature, the core is usually defined by intersecting (2) with u¯0 = 0 [45–48]
However, this new core is in general empty [45]. Furthermore, such core definitions implicitly assume that a transaction
can occur even without the involvement of the central operator. This is not true for the electricity markets since the
dispatch has to be secure.
13In Appendix F, we characterize the instances in which the VCG mechanism has a deficit. In Appendix G, we
also prove that the VCG mechanism is not coalition-proof in exchanges.
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budget-balanced, and IR simultaneously [49]. Fortunately, under the core selecting mechanisms,
we can guarantee budget-balance.
Theorem 3 Any core-selecting mechanism is budget-balanced.
The proof is relegated to Appendix H. It follows that the MPCS mechanism is budget-balanced
in addition to the properties discussed in Section 3.2.1. Furthermore, this also provides an alter-
native proof to the budget-balance of LMP.
We highlight that the LMP mechanism provides methods to reallocate its budget surplus
through financial transmission and flowgate congestion rights [6, 50]. These rights are important
tools to provide market signals to incentivize investment in transmission capacity. In order to
compensate the owners of these rights in the MPCS mechanism, a plausible solution is to include
them as an additional constraint to (5), that is,
∑
l∈W u¯l ≤ −J(B)−∆r where ∆r ≥ 0 is the total
rights to be paid. Defining ways to incorporate these rights, and providing the correct investment
signals for transmission capacity expansion, is part of our ongoing work.
4 Numerical Results
Our goal is to compare the effectiveness of the mechanisms we have discussed, based on electric-
ity market examples. First, we consider the AC-OPF problem from [51]. This problem yields a
nonzero duality gap, and hence the Lagrange multipliers cannot be guaranteed to have an eco-
nomic rationale. As an alternative, we show that the MPCS mechanism coincides with the VCG
mechanism, and hence it is both coalition-proof and DSIC. We then study the two-stage Swiss
reserve procurement auction from [29] which also fails to attain strong duality. For this example,
the VCG mechanism is not core-selecting, and hence it is not coalition-proof. Instead, the MPCS
mechanism yields a coalition-proof outcome. Finally, we consider a two-sided market with DC-OPF
constraints to compare the budget-balance under the pay-as-bid, LMP, MPCS, and VCG mecha-
nisms. We show that we can compute the MPCS mechanism in a reasonable time. All problems
are solved on a computer equipped with 32 GB RAM and a 4.0 GHz quad-core Intel i7 processor.
4.1 AC-OPF problem with a duality gap
The following simulation is based on a 5-bus network model given in [51]. Apart from having
additional generators, the network model is the same as the model in [51]. We provide the generator
costs for active power in Table 1. For this problem, strong duality does not hold. We verified this by
showing that the semidefinite programming relaxation is not tight for this polynomial optimization
problem [52]. Consequently, Lagrange multipliers may not be meaningful in an economic sense.
We highlight that we can solve this problem to global optimality via the second level of moment
relaxations (sum-of-squares hierarchy) [52].
Payments under the pay-as-bid and the MPCS mechanisms are provided in Table 1. Note that
the pay-as-bid mechanism would actually not lead to truthful behavior. It is provided for compar-
ison since the LMP mechanism is not applicable. For this example, even though the constraints
are not polymatroid-type, the MPCS mechanism happens to coincide with the VCG mechanism,
attaining the DSIC property. Moreover, we can ensure that losing bidders 3 and 4 cannot profit
from collusion, and no bidder can profit from bidding with multiple identities.
As a remark, for this problem, we can show that there is no linear price function that would
yield a competitive equilibrium. Since the bids are convex, the condition in (3) requires assigning
bidder 1 a linear price equal to its marginal cost at 246MW. This price is given by $53.2/MW,
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Table 1: Generator data for 5-bus AC-OPF problem
Gen. Node Cost x∗i MW Pay-as-bid MPCS
1 1 .1x21 + 4x1 246.0 $7038.0 $12772.3
2 5 .1x22 + 1x2 98.2 $1061.5 $2435.6
3 1 .1x23 + 30x3 0 0 0
4 5 .1x24 + 15x4 0 0 0
Table 2: Total payments of the reserve market (million CHF)
Pay-as-bid MPCS VCG
2.293 2.437 2.529
yielding the payment $13087.2. Under this payment mechanism, utility of the bidder 1 cannot be
in the core since this utility is greater than its VCG utility. This concludes the nonexistence of a
competitive equilibrium in linear prices for this problem.
This AC-OPF problem was solved in 1.85 seconds using the method in [53] with MOSEK 9 [54]
called through MATLAB. To verify that the VCG utilities are in the core, we solved this problem
under 22−1 different coalitions by ignoring the core constraints that involve losing bidders, see [19].
4.2 Swiss reserve procurement auctions
The following simulation is the Swiss reserve procurement auction in the 46th week of 2014 which
is based on a pay-as-bid payment rule [29]. This auction involves 21 plants bidding for secondary
reserves, 25 for positive tertiary reserves and 21 for negative tertiary reserves. The bids are discrete,
that is, they are given by sets of reserve size and price pairs. Notice that the formulation in
Section 2 can capture such bids. The objective also includes a second stage cost corresponding
to the uncertain daily auctions. Moreover, the market involves complex constraints arising from
nonlinear cumulative distribution functions. These constraints imply that the deficit of reserves
cannot occur with a probability higher than 0.2%, and they include coupling between the first and
the second stage decision variables. Since this problem does not attain strong duality, meaningful
linear prices cannot be derived. The total payments of the pay-as-bid, MPCS, and VCG mechanisms
are shown in Table 2. Notice that the VCG utilities do not lie in the core since otherwise the
MPCS mechanism would coincide with the VCG mechanism. As a result, the MPCS mechanism
is coalition-proof, but it does not attain the DSIC property. As is discussed in Lemma 2, we can
still quantify the loss of the DSIC property by the difference between the MPCS and the VCG
payments.
For this market, the MPCS problem (5) in its current form is not computationally feasible since
the core in (2) requires solutions to (1) under 267 different sets of bidders. The problem can be tack-
led efficiently using an iterative constraint generation algorithm [19,55,56]. At every iteration, the
method generates the constraint with the largest violation for a provisional solution. In practice,
the method requires the generation of only a few core constraints. Using this method, the problem
was solved in 8 seconds with GUROBI 7.5 [57] called through MATLAB via YALMIP [58]. Com-
putation times for the VCG mechanism and the MPCS mechanism are 580.6 and 659.2 seconds,
respectively. The iterative algorithm required the generation of only 4 constraints. This shows that
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Figure 2: Two-sided DC-OPF model
the MPCS mechanism can be computed in a reasonable time even when there are many market
participants.
4.3 Two-sided markets with DC-OPF constraints
We consider the DC-OPF problem in Figure 2. Bids are quadratic polynomials. All lines have the
same susceptance. Line limit from node i to node j is denoted by Ci,j = Cj,i ∈ R+. The optimal
allocation is computed as x∗ = [0.58, 0.58, 4, −5.16] MW. The pay-as-bid mechanism yields a
positive budget of $48.3. The LMP mechanism also results in a positive budget since the limits
C3,1 and C3,2 are tight at the optimal solution [6, Fact 5]. This balance is $2.8. For this problem,
the MPCS mechanism achieves strong budget-balance with $0. Finally, the VCG mechanism has
a deficit of −$34.8.
By definition, under the MPCS mechanism sum of the utilities of the bidders are higher than
the one under the LMP mechanism. However, we underline that under the MPCS mechanism, not
every bidder receives a utility higher than its LMP utility. In this DC-OPF problem, the total
utility of the supply-side reduces by $4.1, whereas the utility of the demand-side increases by $6.9
when we compare the MPCS outcome with the LMP outcome.
This problem was solved in 0.32 seconds with GUROBI 7.5 [57] called through MATLAB via
YALMIP [58]. To calculate the MPCS payments, we solved the problem under 24 − 1 different
coalitions.
5 Conclusion
For the general class of electricity markets, the dominant-strategy incentive-compatible VCG mech-
anism is susceptible to collusion and shill bidding. This motivated the design of core-selecting
mechanisms for their coalition-proofness. We showed that the well-established LMP mechanism is
core-selecting, and hence coalition-proof. This result was an implication of a stronger result we
proved, core-selecting mechanisms are the exact mechanisms that ensure the existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium in linear/nonlinear prices. In contrast to LMP, we showed that core-selecting
mechanisms are applicable to a broad class of markets with nonconvex bids and nonconvex con-
straint sets. We then characterized a class of core-selecting mechanisms that can approximate
dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility without the price-taking assumption. In the case of an
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exchange market, we proved that core-selecting mechanisms are also budget-balanced. Our results
were verified in several case studies based on realistic electricity market models.
Our future work will explore ways to reallocate budget surplus in core-selecting mechanisms to
provide correct investment signals for transmission capacity expansion.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
We show that if an allocation x∗ and price functions {ψl}l∈L constitute a competitive equilibrium,
then x∗ is the optimal solution to the optimization problem defined by J(C) in (1). By the first
condition in (3), we have∑
l∈L
ψl(x
∗
l )− cl(x∗l ) ≥
∑
l∈L
ψl(xl)− cl(xl), ∀x ∈ X, (6)
where X =
∏
l∈LXl. Define (x∗, y∗) as the optimal solution pair to the optimization problem in (4),
and (x∗(C), y∗(C)) as the optimal solution pair to the problem defined by J(C). Then, we obtain
the following∑
l∈L
cl(x
∗
l ) + d(x
∗, y∗)
≤
∑
l∈L
ψl(x
∗
l )− ψl(x∗l (C)) + cl(x∗l (C)) + d(x∗, y∗)
= J(C) +
∑
l∈L
ψl(x
∗
l ) + d(x
∗, y∗)−
(∑
l∈L
ψl(x
∗
l (C)) + d(x∗(C), y∗(C))
)
≤ J(C).
The first inequality follows from (6). We then obtain the equality by adding and subtracting
the term d(x∗(C), y∗(C)), and substituting J(C) = ∑l∈L cl(x∗l (C)) + d(x∗(C), y∗(C)). The second
inequality follows since (x∗(C), y∗(C)) is a suboptimal feasible solution to the optimization problem
in (4). We remark that (x∗, y∗) is originally feasible for the problem defined by J(C), otherwise,
it would not satisfy the constraints in both (3) and (4). Hence, from the last inequality, we can
conclude that (x∗, y∗) is in fact an optimal solution pair to the optimization problem defined by
J(C). Since previously we assumed that the optimal solution is unique according to some tie-braking
rule, we obtain the desired result x∗ = x∗(C). 
B Proof of Theorem 1
We generalize the arguments from [40, 41] that characterize competitive equilibria of multi-item
assignment problems, to continuous goods, second stage cost, general constraints, and core-selecting
mechanisms. Our proof is different from these works since it does not rely on weak duality arguments
that are available to the multi-item setting with simple constraints.
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Invoking Lemma 1, for both directions of the proof we restrict our attention to the optimal
allocation under truthful bids.
( ⇐= ) For the market (1), we first prove that if a mechanism ensures the existence of a
competitive equilibrium, then it is a core-selecting mechanism. To do so, we show that the revealed
utilities lie in the core.
Given the bid profile B = {bl}l∈L, allocation x∗(B) and price functions {ψl}l∈L, we have;
x∗l (B) ∈ arg max
xl∈Xˆl
ψl(xl)− bl(xl),∀l ∈ L, (7)
x∗(B) ∈ arg min
x∈Rt|L|+
 miny:h(x,y)=0
g(x,y)≤0
∑
l∈L
ψl(xl) + d(x, y)
 . (8)
These conditions must hold because the mechanism does not know the true costs C, and it has to
ensures the existence of an efficient competitive equilibrium in case the true costs are given by B =
{bl}l∈L. Notice that the price functions depend on the bid profile, ψl(xl) = ψl(xl;B), and we drop
this dependence for the sake of simplicity in notation. Using ψl(x
∗
l (B)) = pl(B), the revealed utilities
are defined by u¯l(B) = ψl(x∗l (B)) − bl(x∗l (B)), and u¯0(B) = −
∑
l∈L ψl(x
∗
l (B)) − d(x∗(B), y∗(B)),
where y∗(B) is the optimal solution to (8).
Next, we show that u¯(B) ∈ Core(B). First, observe that the individual-rationality constraints
are satisfied; u¯l(B) ≥ 0 since 0 ∈ Xˆl, ψl(0) = 0, and bl(0) = 0. Second, we have the equality
constraints in (2):
∑
l∈L u¯l(B) + u¯0(B) = −
∑
l∈L bl(x
∗
l (B))− d(x∗(B), y∗(B)) = −J(B). Third, we
show that the inequality constraints in (2) hold, that is,
− u¯0(B) ≤ J(BS) +
∑
l∈S
u¯l(B), ∀S ⊂ L. (9)
Define the following restricted problem for any subset S ⊂ L,
µ0(S) = − min
x∈Xˆ, y
x−S=0
∑
l∈S
ψl(xl) + d(x, y)
s.t. h(x, y) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0,
(10)
where the optimal allocation is denoted by x∗(S). Because x∗(S) is a feasible solution to (8), we
obtain −u¯0(B) ≤ −µ0(S). We then let x∗(BS) be the optimal solution to J(BS). This solution is
a suboptimal feasible solution to (10) and hence −µ0(S) ≤
∑
l∈S ψl(x
∗
l (BS)) + d(x∗(BS), y∗(BS)).
Then, it suffices to show that∑
l∈S
ψl(x
∗
l (BS))+d(x∗(BS), y∗(BS))
≤ J(BS) +
∑
l∈S
u¯l(B), ∀S ⊂ L,
(11)
since this would imply the inequality in (9). Via the condition in (7), we have
ψl(x
∗
l (BS))− bl(x∗l (BS)) ≤ ψl(x∗l (B))− bl(x∗l (B)) = u¯l(B).
Summing the inequality above over all l ∈ S, we obtain∑
l∈S
ψl(x
∗
l (BS))− bl(x∗l (BS)) ≤
∑
l∈S
u¯l(B).
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By adding d(x∗(BS), y∗(BS)) on both sides and reorganizing, the above inequality yields (11).
Consequently, we have −u¯0(B) ≤ J(BS) +
∑
l∈S u¯l(B), for any S ⊂ L. Hence, the revealed utilities
lie in Core(B).
( =⇒ ) We now prove that any core-selecting mechanism ensures the existence of an efficient
competitive equilibrium. In other words, we show that, for the truthful optimal allocation x∗(C) ∈
X, there exists a set of price functions ψl : Rt+ → R, ∀l such that the conditions in Definition 1
are satisfied, and ψl(x
∗
l (C)) = pl(C). Consider the utility allocation u ∈ Core(C) of a core-selecting
mechanism under truthful bidding. Then, define the price functions {ψl}l∈L as follows
ψl(x) =

0 x = 0
cl(x) + ul x ∈ Xl \ {0}
∞ otherwise.
For these price functions, the first condition in (3) holds by construction. To show that, we study
two possible cases. If x∗l (C) is nonzero, then x∗l (C) ∈ arg maxxl∈Xl ψl(xl) − c(xl) since ul ≥ 0. On
the other hand, if x∗l (C) = 0, then ul = 0 and 0 ∈ arg maxxl∈Xl 0.
We prove the second condition (4) by contradiction. Assume there exists x, y such that h(x, y) =
0, g(x, y) ≤ 0, and ∑
l∈L
ψl(x
∗
l (C)) + d(x∗(C), y∗(C)) >
∑
l∈L
ψl(xl) + d(x, y). (12)
Define a subset S ⊆ L such that xl = 0 for all l ∈ L \ S. Observe that if xl > 0, ∀l, then S = L.
Then, the core implies
− u0 = J(C) +
∑
l∈L
ul =
∑
l∈L
ψl(x
∗
l (C)) + d(x∗(C), y∗(C)), (13)
The second equality follows from the definition of the price functions. Using the second equality
in (13), the inequality in (12) is equivalent to
J(C) +
∑
l∈L
ul >
∑
l∈S
ψl(xl) + d(x, y).
By the definition of ψl, we obtain
J(C) +
∑
l∈L\S
ul >
∑
l∈S
cl(xl) + d(x, y) ≥ J(CS),
where the last inequality is from the feasible suboptimality of (x, y) for the problem defined by
J(CS). This is because h(x, y) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0, and x ∈ X (otherwise, the price functions are
unbounded).
Using the first equality in (13), we have u0 +
∑
l∈S ul < −J(CS) for S ⊆ L. This contradicts
u ∈ Core(C), and the mechanism cannot be core-selecting. We conclude that x∗(C) is optimal
for the central operator given the price functions. As a result, x∗(C) and {ψl}l∈L constitute a
competitive equilibrium. Finally, from pl(C) = cl(x∗l (C)) + ul, we have ψl(x∗l (C)) = pl(C) for each
bidder l. This concludes the proof. 
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C Comparison of the LMP and the VCG Payments
Proposition 1 Given any bid profile B, for every bidder l the payment under the LMP mechanism
is upper bounded by the payment under the VCG mechanism.
Proof A similar result was proven in [18], using convex analysis in the context of DC-OPF markets.
We provide a simple and more general proof applicable to any setting where the LMP mechanism
ensures the existence of a competitive equilibrium. The proof is an adaptation of [59, Theorem 5]
that compares the utilities of iterative ascending auctions with that of the VCG mechanism. Since
the LMP utilities lie in the core, it suffices to show that the VCG revealed utilities are greater than
any other revealed utility in the core.
The VCG payment of bidder l is given by
pVCGl = bl(x
∗
l (B)) + (J(B−l)− J(B)),
whereas the revealed VCG utility is u¯VCGl = J(B−l) − J(B). Assume there exists a revealed utility
allocation u˜ ∈ Core(B) where u˜l > u¯VCGl . These utilities are blocked by the coalition L−l;
−J(B−l) > −J(B)− u˜l = u˜0 +
∑
k∈L−l
u˜k,
where the equality follows from the definition of the core. This contradicts that u˜ ∈ Core(B). We
conclude that the core utilities are upper bounded by the ones under the VCG mechanism. We
obtain the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 1 simplifies the arguments in [18] greatly. Furthermore, this upper bound is
tight for some core-selecting mechanism since u¯VCGl = max {u¯l | u¯ ∈ Core(B)}, see [39, Theorem 2].
D Proof of Lemma 2
Assume there exists a bid bˆl : Xˆl → R+ such that[
bˆl(x
∗
l (Bˆl,B−l))− cl(x∗l (Bˆl,B−l)) + u¯l(Bˆl,B−l)
]− u¯l(Cl,B−l) > [J(B−l)− J(Cl,B−l)]− u¯l(Cl,B−l),
where Bˆl = {bˆl}. This is equivalent to the existence of a deviation that is more profitable than the
given upper bound. Notice that the following holds
u¯l(Bˆl,B−l) ≤ u¯VCGl (Bˆl,B−l) = J(B−l)− J(Bˆl,B−l),
since u¯VCGl (Bˆl,B−l) = max{u¯l | u¯ ∈ Core(Bˆl,B−l)} [39]. Combining the inequalities above, we have
bˆl(x
∗
l (Bˆl,B−l))− cl(x∗l (Bˆl,B−l)) + J(B−l)− J(Bˆl,B−l)
> J(B−l)− J(Cl,B−l).
We highlight that the first term is the VCG utility under a non-truthful bid, whereas the second
term is the VCG utility under a truthful bid. The strict inequality above contradicts the dominant-
strategy incentive-compatibility of the VCG mechanism. We conclude that u¯VCGl (Cl,B−l)−u¯l(Cl,B−l)
is an upper bound on the gain from a unilateral deviation.
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Next, define  to be a small positive number which is required to avoid ties. It is straightforward
to show that the following bid achieves exactly the truthful VCG utility, and hence the exact upper
bound in u¯VCGl (Cl,B−l)− u¯l(Cl,B−l):
bˆl(x) =

0 x = 0
cl(x) + u¯
VCG
l (Cl,B−l)−  x ∈ Xl \ 0
∞ otherwise.
Since the market solves for the optimal allocation in (1), if bidder l is allocated a positive quantity
while bidding truthfully, then this bidder is also allocated a positive quantity while bidding bˆl.
Moreover, under any core-selecting mechanism, we have  ≥ u¯VCGl (Bˆl,B−l) ≥ u¯l(Bˆl,B−l) ≥ 0 where
Bˆl = bˆl. As a result, by bidding bˆl, the bidder l obtains its truthful VCG utility, ul(Bˆl,B−l) =
u¯VCGl (Cl,B−l)− + u¯l(Bˆl,B−l), and achieves exactly the upper bound in the lemma. 
E Proof of Theorem 2
For the proof, we ignore the second term in the objective of the MPCS mechanism since it is
required only for tie-breaking purposes. Assume bidders are revealing their true costs C = {cl}l∈L
under the MPCS mechanism. We can reformulate the problem (5) as follows,
u¯MPCS(C) = arg max
u∈Core(C)
∑
l∈L
ul −
∑
l∈L
u¯VCGl (C)
= arg min
u∈Core(C)
∑
l∈L
(u¯VCGl (C)− ul) . (14)
Invoking Lemma 2, the problem in (14) implies that the MPCS mechanism minimizes the sum of
maximum profits of each bidder from a unilateral deviation among all other core-selecting mecha-
nisms. 
F Characterizing Deficit Under the VCG Mechanism
Notice that the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem does not rule out the possibility of
having realizations of the VCG mechanism that are budget-balanced. Next, we extend the impos-
sibility theorem by showing that in a DC-OPF market with no line limits the VCG mechanism is
at most strongly budget-balanced.
Proposition 2 The VCG mechanism never yields a positive utility for the operator in a DC-OPF
market with no line limits.
We need the following lemma for our proof.
Lemma 3 Assume J is modeled by
J(C) = min
xl∈Xl,∀l
∑
l∈L
cl(xl) s.t.
∑
l∈L
xl = 0, (15)
where cl, ∀l are convex increasing and Xl, ∀l are polytopic constraints. Define q C as the bid profile
consisting of C replicated q times. Then, for any q ∈ N+, we have qJ(C) = J(q C).
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Proof We prove this by showing that the optimal solution to J(q C) is given by concatenating the
decision variables in the optimal solution of J(C) q times. Since the problem defined by J satisfies
constraint qualification conditions, the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for the
optimality of a solution [34]. We see that the KKT conditions of J(q C) are satisfied by a primal
solution which is the concatenation of the optimal solution of J(C) in (15) q times, and a dual
solution which is the Lagrange multiplier of the equality constraint of J(C) in (15). This concludes
that qJ(C) = J(q C). 
Note that this market model includes the DC-OPF markets where the network graph is con-
nected and there are no line limits. We are now ready to prove Proposition 2.
Proof (Proof of Proposition 2) We prove this by contradiction. Under the VCG mechanism, as-
sume the operator has a positive utility:
0 < u0(C) = −J(C)−
∑
l∈W
(J(C−l)− J(C)),
where W ⊆ L is the set of bidders whose allocations are not zero. By reorganizing, we obtain
|W |J(C) > J(CW ) +
∑
l∈W
J(C−l) ≥ J(|W | C).
where |W | C is a bid profile consisting of C replicated |W | times. The last inequality follows because
the allocation of the problems on the left is a suboptimal feasible allocation to the problem on
the right. Note further that |W |J(C) = J(|W | C). This follows from Lemma 3. We obtain a
contradiction J(|W | C) < J(|W | C). Hence, the VCG mechanism achieves at most strong budget-
balance, and it never yields a positive utility for the operator in this case. 
As a remark, the LMP mechanism is strongly budget-balanced for the same market under any
bid profile [6, Fact 5]. Under the VCG mechanism, it is straightforward to create a two-bidder
example of the market in (15) that yields a negative utility for the operator.
Example 1 Suppose there are two bidders in the market (15). The cost function of bidder 1 is given
by c1(x1) = x1, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1. The cost function of bidder 2 is given by c2(x2) = 3x2, −1 ≤ x1 ≤ 0.
Under the VCG mechanism, bidder 1 receives the payment $3 since pVCG1 = 1 + (0 − (−2)) = $3.
Whereas bidder 2 makes the payment $1 since pVCG2 = −3 + (0− (−2)) = −$1. Hence, the central
operator has a $2 deficit.
G Coalition-Proofness of the VCG Mechanism in an Exchange
Market
We first bring in the definition of supermodularity.
Definition 2 A function J is supermodular if J(BS)−J(BS\l) ≤ J(BR)−J(BR\l) for all coalitions
S ⊆ R ⊆ L and for each bidder l ∈ S under any bid profile.
We show that the VCG mechanism is not coalition-proof in an exchange market by showing
that the market objective function J can never be supermodular. For the following, we assume
that if there is at most one bidder in the exchange, no exchange occurs, that is, J(Bl) = 0, for all
l ∈ L and J(∅) = 0.
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Proposition 3 In an exchange market, the function J in (1) is never supermodular unless no
exchange occurs, J(BS) = 0, ∀S ⊆ L.
Proof Assume that the function J is supermodular. Then, for bidders i, j, k ∈ L, we have
J(B{i,j})− J(Bj) ≤ J(B{i,j,k})− J(B{j,k}).
This concludes that J(B{j,k}) ≤ 0, since J(Bj) = 0 and J(B{i,j}) ≥ J(B{i,j,k}). Supermodularity
further implies that
J(Bk)− J(∅) ≤ J(B{j,k})− J(Bj).
This yields J(B{j,k}) ≥ 0 since J(∅) = 0. Hence, we obtain J(B{j,k}) = 0. Moreover, this holds for
any bidder pair j, k. By using this result, we repeat the steps above to obtain J(B{i,j,k}) = 0, ∀i, j, k.
We conclude that similar steps can be repeated until we obtain J(BS) = 0, for every subset S ⊆ L.
Note that this holds under any bid profile B. 
Invoking [19, Theorem 3], we conclude that the VCG mechanism is not coalition-proof. We
highlight that, to the best of our knowledge, this impossibility result for exchanges is novel. An
intuition behind it is that an exchange allows for different kind of manipulations than the ones in
a one-sided auction. For instance, a bidder can enter the market both as a buyer and as a seller.
Then, it can manipulate the outcome by changing the amount it buys and it sells, knowing that
its final allocation is given by their difference.
H Proof of Theorem 3
Consider the revealed utility allocation u¯ ∈ Core(B) of a core-selecting mechanism. Using u¯0 =
−J(B)−∑l∈L u¯l, we derive an equivalent characterization of the inequality constraints in the core
as follows ∑
l∈L\S
u¯l ≤ J(BS)− J(B), ∀S ⊆ L.
Setting K = L \S, these inequalities are equivalent to ∑l∈K u¯l(B) ≤ J(B−K)− J(B), for every set
of bidders K ⊆ L. By keeping the most binding constraints, we obtain∑
l∈K
u¯l ≤ J(B−K)− J(B), ∀K ⊆W, (16)
where W ⊆ L is the set of bidders whose allocations are not zero. Next, we assume that the pay-as-
bid mechanism is budget-balanced, u0(B) = −J(B) ≥ 0 under any bid profile. This assumption is
satisfied in many exchange markets, for instance, combinatorial exchanges [44], DC-OPF exchange
problems [6] and two-sided electricity markets [18]. Using this assumption, the inequality in (16)
implies that ∑
l∈W
u¯l ≤ J(B−W )− J(B) ≤ −J(B),
since J(B−W ) ≤ 0. By reorganizing, we have −J(B) −
∑
l∈L u¯l ≥ 0, since bidders who receive
zero allocation are not paid. Using the equality constraint of the core in (2), we conclude that
u¯0 = u0 ≥ 0. Hence, the central operator ends up with a nonnegative utility. 
19
References
[1] R. Wilson, “Architecture of power markets,” Econometrica, vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 1299–1340,
2002.
[2] P. Cramton, “Electricity market design,” Oxford Review of Econ. Policy, vol. 33, no. 4, pp.
589–612, 2017.
[3] ——, “Electricity market design: The good, the bad, and the ugly,” in Annual Hawaii Int.
Conf. on System Sciences. IEEE, 2003, pp. 8–15.
[4] S. Bose and S. H. Low, “Some emerging challenges in electricity markets,” 2018, Accepted for
publication in Springer volume on ”Smart Grid Control: Overview and Research Opportuni-
ties”.
[5] F. C. Schweppe, M. C. Caramanis, R. D. Tabors, and R. E. Bohn, Spot pricing of electricity,
1988.
[6] F. Wu, P. Varaiya, P. Spiller, and S. Oren, “Folk theorems on transmission access: Proofs and
counterexamples,” J. of Reg. Econ., vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 5–23, 1996.
[7] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic theory. Oxford University
press New York, 1995, vol. 1.
[8] P. Joskow and E. Kahn, “A quantitative analysis of pricing behavior in California’s wholesale
electricity market during summer 2000,” in Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, vol. 1.
IEEE, 2001, pp. 392–394.
[9] R. P. O’Neill, P. M. Sotkiewicz, B. F. Hobbs, M. H. Rothkopf, and W. R. Stewart Jr, “Efficient
market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities,” European J. of Oper. Research, vol.
164, no. 1, pp. 269–285, 2005.
[10] J. Lavaei and S. Sojoudi, “Competitive equilibria in electricity markets with nonlinearities,”
in American Control Conf. IEEE, 2012, pp. 3081–3088.
[11] J. Warrington, P. Goulart, S. Marie´thoz, and M. Morari, “A market mechanism for solving
multi-period optimal power flow exactly on AC networks with mixed participants,” in Ameri-
can Control Conf. IEEE, 2012, pp. 3101–3107.
[12] S. Bikhchandani and J. W. Mamer, “Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with
indivisibilities,” J. of Econ. Theory, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 385–413, 1997.
[13] W. Vickrey, “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders,” The J. of Fi-
nance, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 8–37, 1961.
[14] E. H. Clarke, “Multipart pricing of public goods,” Public choice, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 17–33,
1971.
[15] T. Groves, “Incentives in teams,” Econometrica, pp. 617–631, 1973.
[16] P. Samadi, H. Mohsenian-Rad, R. Schober, and V. W. Wong, “Advanced demand side man-
agement for the future smart grid using mechanism design,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid,
vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1170–1180, 2012.
20
[17] P. G. Sessa, N. Walton, and M. Kamgarpour, “Exploring the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism for electricity markets,” IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 189–194, 2017.
[18] Y. Xu and S. H. Low, “An efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for wholesale elec-
tricity markets,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 128–138, 2017.
[19] O. Karaca, P. G. Sessa, N. Walton, and M. Kamgarpour, “Designing coalition-proof reverse
auctions over continuous goods,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.06774, 2017.
[20] O. Karaca and M. Kamgarpour, “Exploiting weak supermodularity for coalition-proof mech-
anisms,” in IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.11030, 2018.
[21] B. F. Hobbs, M. H. Rothkopf, L. C. Hyde, and R. P. O’Neill, “Evaluation of a truthful
revelation auction in the context of energy markets with nonconcave benefits,” J. of Reg.
Econ., vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 5–32, 2000.
[22] L. M. Ausubel and P. Milgrom, “The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction,” in Combinatorial
Auctions. MIT press, 2006, ch. 1.
[23] M. H. Rothkopf, “Thirteen reasons why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process is not practical,”
Operations Res., vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 191–197, 2007.
[24] A. Schrijver, Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency. Springer Science & Busi-
ness Media, 2003, vol. 24.
[25] E. Anderson and T. D. Cau, “Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity
markets,” European J. of Oper. Research, vol. 211, no. 2, pp. 403–414, 2011.
[26] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A course in game theory. MIT press, 1994.
[27] R. Day and P. Milgrom, “Core-selecting package auctions,” Int. J. of Game Theory, vol. 36,
no. 3-4, pp. 393–407, 2008.
[28] L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, “The assignment game i: The core,” Int. J. of Game Theory,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 111–130, 1971.
[29] F. Abbaspourtorbati and M. Zima, “The Swiss reserve market: Stochastic programming in
practice,” IEEE Trans. on Power Syst., vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 1188–1194, 2016.
[30] A. J. Conejo, M. Carrio´n, and J. M. Morales, Decision making under uncertainty in electricity
markets. Springer, 2010, vol. 1.
[31] M. Beck and M. Ott, “Revenue monotonicity in core-selecting package auctions,” Working
paper, Tech. Rep., 2009.
[32] L. M. Ausubel, P. Cramton, M. Pycia, M. Rostek, and M. Weretka, “Demand reduction and
inefficiency in multi-unit auctions,” The Review of Econ. Studies, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 1366–1400,
2014.
[33] P. R. Gribik, W. W. Hogan, and S. L. Pope, “Market-clearing electricity prices and energy
uplift,” working paper, 2007.
[34] D. P. Bertsekas, Nonlinear programming. Athena Scientific, 1999.
21
[35] B. C. Lesieutre, D. K. Molzahn, A. R. Borden, and C. L. DeMarco, “Examining the limits
of the application of semidefinite programming to power flow problems,” in Annual Allerton
Conf. on Communication, Control, and Computing. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1492–1499.
[36] S. H. Low, “Convex relaxation of optimal power flowpart ii: Exactness,” IEEE Trans. on
Control of Network Syst., vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 177–189, 2014.
[37] V. Krishna and M. Perry, “Efficient mechanism design,” Tech. Rep., 1998.
[38] R. Christie, “Power systems test case archive,” Electrical Engineering dept., University of
Washington, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www2.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/
[39] O. Karaca and M. Kamgarpour, “Game theoretic analysis of electricity market auction mech-
anisms,” in IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, 2017, pp. 6211–6216.
[40] S. Bikhchandani and J. M. Ostroy, “The package assignment model,” J. of Econ. Theory, vol.
107, no. 2, pp. 377–406, 2002.
[41] D. C. Parkes, “On indirect and direct implementations of core outcomes in combinatorial
auctions,” 2002. [Online]. Available: https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4101257
[42] ——, “Iterative combinatorial auctions,” in Combinatorial Auctions. MIT press, 2006, ch. 2.
[43] J. R. Green and J.-J. Laffont, Incentives in public decision making. North-Holland, 1979.
[44] D. C. Parkes, J. Kalgnanam, and M. Eso, “Achieving budget-balance with VCG-based payment
schemes in combinatorial exchanges,” IBM Res. Report, RC22218 W0110-065, 2002.
[45] K. Hoffman and D. Menon, “A practical combinatorial clock exchange for spectrum licenses,”
Decision Analysis, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 58–77, 2010.
[46] R. Day, “The division of surplus in efficient combinatorial exchanges,” working paper, 2013.
[47] M. Bichler and S. Waldherr, “Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges,” Econ.
Letters, vol. 157, pp. 145–147, 2017.
[48] P. Milgrom, “Package auctions and exchanges,” Econometrica, vol. 75, no. 4, pp. 935–965,
2007.
[49] R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,” J. of
Econ. Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 265–281, 1983.
[50] W. W. Hogan, “Contract networks for electric power transmission,” J. of Reg. Econ., vol. 4,
no. 3, pp. 211–242, 1992.
[51] W. A. Bukhsh, A. Grothey, K. I. McKinnon, and P. A. Trodden, “Local solutions of the
optimal power flow problem,” IEEE Trans. on Power Syst., vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 4780–4788,
2013.
[52] D. K. Molzahn and I. A. Hiskens, “Moment-based relaxation of the optimal power flow prob-
lem,” in Power Syst. Computation Conf. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–7.
[53] ——, “Sparsity-exploiting moment-based relaxations of the optimal power flow problem,”
IEEE Trans. on Power Syst., vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 3168–3180, 2015.
22
[54] MOSEK, “The MOSEK optimization toolbox for MATLAB manual,” 2018.
[55] R. W. Day and S. Raghavan, “Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combi-
natorial auctions,” Management Science, vol. 53, no. 9, pp. 1389–1406, 2007.
[56] B. Bu¨nz, S. Seuken, and B. Lubin, “A faster core constraint generation algorithm for combi-
natorial auctions,” in Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, 2015.
[57] Gurobi Optimization Inc., “Gurobi optimizer reference manual,” 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://www.gurobi.com
[58] J. Lo¨fberg, “YALMIP: A toolbox for modeling and optimization in MATLAB,” in Int. Sym-
posium on Computer Aided Control Syst. Design. IEEE, 2005, pp. 284–289.
[59] L. M. Ausubel and P. Milgrom, “Ascending auctions with package bidding,” Frontiers of
Theoretical Econ., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–42, 2002.
23
